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REDUCTIONISM: EXPOSING THE ROOTS OF THE
EGYPTIANISM OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION
Arran Gare
ABSTRACT: We have reached the peculiar situation where the advance of mainstream science
has  required  us  to  dismiss  as  unreal  our  own existence  as  free,  creative  agents,  the  very
condition of there being science at all. Efforts to free science from this dead-end and to give a
place to creative becoming in the world have been hampered  by unexamined assumptions
about  what  science  should  be,  assumptions  which presuppose  that  if  creative  becoming  is
explained, it will be explained away as an illusion. In this paper it is shown that this problem
has permeated the whole of European civilization from the Ancient Greeks onwards, leading to
a  radical  disjunction  between  cosmology  which  aims  at  a  grasp  of  the  universe  through
mathematics and history which aims to comprehend human action through stories. By going
back to the Ancient Greeks and tracing the evolution of the denial of creative becoming, I trace
the layers of assumptions that must in some way be transcended if we are to develop a truly
post-Egyptian science consistent with the forms of understanding and explanation that have
evolved within history.
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In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche characterized the idiosyncrasy of philosophers:
There is ... their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They
think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricise it,  sub specie aeterni—
when  they  make  a  mummy  of  it.  All  that  philosophers  have  handled  for
millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped their hands
alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters—they
become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age,
as well  as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations even.
What is, does not  become; what becomes is not … Now they all believe, even to
the point of despair, in that which is.1
Is this a correct characterization of philosophy? And if it is, What is the source of this
idiosyncrasy?  and  Why  has  it  prevailed?  And  what  has  been  the  effect  of  this
idiosyncrasy? 
Nietzsche was referring to philosophy  over its  entire history,  from the Ancient
Greeks onwards until his own day. He acknowledged that not all philosophers were
1 Friedrich Nietzsche,  Twilight of the  Idols [1889], tr. R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth,
1968, p. 35. 
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guilty,  citing  Heraclitus  as  an  exception.  But  were  there  not  other  philosophers
concerned with change, creation and death? Surely Aristotle and his followers were
centrally concerned with such issues. But then perhaps even Aristotle, and even more
his followers, were biased against change even when they acknowledged its reality. The
highest reality for Aristotelians was the ‘unmoved movers’, and it was the unchanging
relationship between classes or forms on which Aristotle’s syllogistic logic was based
which  was  extolled  as  the  highest  form  of  knowledge.  More  generally,  given  the
opposing positions of Heraclitus and Parmenides, one seeing the world as perpetually
changing, the other seeing all change as an illusion, the vast majority of philosophers
have aligned themselves with Parmenides, even if they felt compelled to modify this
position to  account  for  at  least  the  appearance  of  change.  The atomists  took  the
unchanging atoms as the basic existents. Plato argued that the eternal forms are real
and knowable,  the sensible world only being taken to be real  and knowable to the
extent that it participates in the forms. The Neoplatonists embraced this doctrine and
took the unchanging One to be the source of all the other forms. This is the philosophy
used to interpret and defend Christianity with God identified with the unchanging One
and the changing sensible world denigrated as a manifestation of our fallen state, a
world of temptations to be overcome. This provided the basic framework of medieval
culture. 
While  Nietzsche  questioned  this  whole  tradition  of  European  thought,  and
Christianity in particular, he was mainly concerned with the culture of modernity. As
Nietzsche recognized, in the modern world Egyptianism is at its most influential and
most problematic in science.2 So while prevailing philosophy was clearly a target, in his
early notebooks Nietzsche was more concerned with science. Science, like philosophy,
has exalted a realm transcending and denying the reality of change to the perceived
world. Writing of the illusions associated with claims to truth, Nietzsche argued that
language works to construct concepts. The outcome of this labour is that ‘the great
edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium3 and exhales
in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics’.4 Science has
taken over this labour, working ‘unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the
graveyard of perceptions.’5 But a concept, Nietzsche argued, ‘is merely the residue of a
metaphor.’6 The ‘truths’  gained by  such labour,  Nietzsche suggested,  ‘are illusions
which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out
and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are
2 See Milič Čapek, ‘The Myth of Frozen Passage: The Status of Becoming in the Physical World’,  Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science,  ed. Robert Cohen and Marx Wartofsky, Vol.2, New York, Humanities
Press, 1965, pp. 441-463.
3 A columbarium is a vault with niches for funeral urns containing the ashes of cremated bodies.
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, ed. and trans,
Daniel Breazeale, New Jersey, Humanities Press, London, 1979, p. 85.
5 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, p.88.
6 ibid., p.85.
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now  considered  as  metal  and  no  longer  as  coins.’7 Science,  taking  the  place  of
Christianity, had consolidated the Egyptianism of European philosophy and culture. 
Nietzsche was writing over a century ago. Has the situation changed? There has
been  a  reaction  against  this  Egyptianism.  Apart  from  philosophers  influenced by
Nietzsche,  Charles  Sanders  Peirce,  Henri  Bergson,  Alfred  North  Whitehead,
hermeneutic phenomenologists and ‘post-structuralists’ among others have struggled to
uphold the reality of temporal becoming. However, while such philosophers have often
gained attention from the public, within the mainstream of academia they have always
been  looked  upon  as  irrationalist  deviations  from  the  quest  for  a  rational
comprehension of the cosmos. Far more significant has been the analytic tradition of
philosophy  which  has  sought  to  develop  and  interpret  symbolic  logic,  to  reduce
mathematics to logic, and to characterize and defend the ultimate goal of science as
creating a logically coherent mathematical structure able to deduce everything that has
occurred in the past or will occur in the future. This goal has been upheld as an ideal
even where it is acknowledged that it is unrealizable in practice. Along with this, the
tradition has sought to uphold an ‘objectivist’ theory of meaning and an ‘objectivist’
theory  of  rationality  virtually  identical  to  that  attacked  by  Nietzsche  in  his  early
notebooks.8 Nicholas Rescher, a contemporary American philosopher uninfluenced by
Nietzsche,  observed  that  philosophers generally  are  overwhelmingly  hostile  to  the
notion of process.9 Egyptianism still reigns supreme. 
Why does this matter? To begin with, despite the successes of efforts to construe the
world in such terms (although these successes are far less than is generally appreciated),
these very successes have generated an increasing number of irresolvable paradoxes.10
To begin with, the very nature of mathematics has become increasingly uncertain.11 In
theoretical physics, quantum theory remains problematic, with no universally accepted
interpretation.  Elementary  particle  physics  is  in  even  greater  difficulties.  While
proponents of string theory proclaim success in uniting quantum theory, the special and
general  relativity  theories  and  elementary  particle  theory,  many  physicists  remain
skeptical  that  any significant achievements  have  been made at  all.12 And it  is  now
recognized that even if string theory were developed successfully, it would still not be
the primary theory of the universe.13 This is at the level of the physical sciences. There
7 ibid., p.84.
8 For an account of this and its inadequacies, see Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of
Meaning, Imagination, and Reason, Chicago and London, The University Of Chicago Press, 1987, Intro. and
Ch. 1.
9 Nicholas Rescher, ‘The Revolt against Process,’ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, 1962, 410-17.
10 For a compendium of these, see A.K. Dewdney,  Beyond Reason: 8 Great Problems That Reveal the Limits of
Science, Hoboken, John Wiley, 2004.
11 For an account of this see Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1980.
12 See  for  instance  C.J.S.  Clarke,  ‘Process  as  a  Primitive  Physical  Category’  in  Time  and  Process:
Interdisciplinary Issues, ed. J.T. Fraser and Lewis Rowell, International Universities Press, 1993, pp. 53-69.
13 Gordon Kane,  Supersymmetry: Squarks, Photinos, and the Unveiling of the Ultimate Laws of Nature, Cambridge,
Mass., Perseus, 2000, p. 132.
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are far deeper problems, however, problems which were evident at the birth of modern
science. If it is the goal to explain the whole of reality in such mathematical terms, there
can be no place for life or mind. Efforts might be made to explain life and mind, but
the success of such efforts would be to have shown that life is not life and mind not
mind, but complex physical structures that have the appearance of life and mind. At
best, the mind would be an epiphenomenon. And if this were the case, the claim to
have knowledge would have been shown to be an illusion, since the epiphenomena of
people claiming to have knowledge, including rival claims by other people, would have
been shown to have been merely mathematically predictable effects.
But it is not only theoretical problems that are at issue. Proponents of science so
conceived openly deny validity to any claim to truth by the humanities (apart from
analytic philosophy); for such science, the narrative forms of literature and history are
merely forms of amusement. And indeed, if time is an illusion, then the claims to truth
in literature or history must be false, because overwhelmingly, the insights claimed in
these domains pertain to a world conceived as in the process of becoming, in which the
future is not determined by the past, and human agency is real, not mere appearance.
In fact this opposition to the humanities is a continuation of the struggle against the
ideas which emerged in the Renaissance. Modern science developed in reaction to and
in opposition to Renaissance culture, both the civic humanism that had developed in
the  Renaissance  and  the  more  radical  ideas  of  the  ‘nature  enthusiasts’  who had
celebrated nature as  divine.  It  was the civic  humanists  who revived and developed
history as  a  discipline.14 The synthesis of  the ideas  of  the civic  humanists  and the
‘nature enthusiasts’ made up what Margaret Jacob called the ‘radical enlightenment’
committed to  democratic  republicanism.15 The ‘moderate enlightenment’  associated
with Cartesian, Newtonian and Leibnizian science, while also opposed to the power
structures inherited from feudalism, was developed in part to neutralize the influence of
the radical enlightenment with its commitment to democracy.16 The hidden project of
this moderate enlightenment was to develop a form of knowledge that would not only
facilitate control over nature, but also facilitate control over people; that is, to produce
a  social  order  in  which  people  would  be  organized  efficiently.17 The relationship
between  this  Egyptianism  of  modern  science  and  this  hidden  project  confirms
Nietzsche’s suggestion that ‘To impose upon becoming the character of being - that is
the supreme will to power.’18 
14 See Hans Baron,  The Crisis of Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of
Classicism and Tyranny, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, Ch. 3.
15 Margaret C. Jacob,  The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans, 2nd ed. The Temple
Publishers, 2003.
16 See Jonathan I.  Israel,  Radical  Enlightenment:  Philosophy and the  Making  of Modernity 1650-1750,  Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2002, Part IV.
17 On this, see Stephen Toulmin,  Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity,  University of Chicago Press,
1990.
18 Friedrich Nietzsche,  The Will  to Power, § 617, tr. Walter Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale, New York,
Vintage, 1968, p. 330.
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It is  the success in the project of  controlling nature and people that  has  given
science its legitimacy as a core institution of modernity; but this success has increasingly
exposed its dark side. This dark side was recognized early by poets who saw in this
drive to control to the world, hostility to life. ‘We murder to dissect’ wrote William
Blake, attacking the new mechanical philosophy and keeping alive the enthusiasm for
living nature that had developed in Renaissance culture. Opposition to this culture of
domination was developed most fully in German philosophy in the work of Herder,
Goethe,  Schelling  and  the  Romantics.  Nietzsche’s  work  can  only  be  properly
understood  as  a  development  of  this  tradition  of  thought.19 Reflecting  on  the
implications of science, Nietzsche asked: 
Has not man’s determination to belittle himself developed apace precisely since
Copernicus? ...  Ever since Copernicus man has been rolling down an incline,
faster  and  faster,  away  from the centre—whither?  … All  science  … is  now
determined to talk  man out of his former respect for  himself,  as  though that
respect had been nothing but a bizarre presumption.20
But  it  was  only  in  the twentieth century  that  the full  implications  of  this  attitude
manifest itself. The brutal aggression through which Europeans had dominated other
people was directed at other Europeans. Then the world was brought to the precipice
of annihilation as the weapons of mass destruction, the ultimate triumph of modern
science forged in Europe’s premier colony, USA, generated an arms race that came
very close to a global nuclear war. Concomitantly, the global ecological crisis revealed
the project of total control of the world to be unviable. It was then that the nihilistic
implications of  this  world  view  reached  their  fullest  expression.21 A  distinguished
Professor of Political Economy at the University of London wrote in Business and Society
Review: ‘Suppose that, as a result of using up all the world’s resources, human life did
come to an end. So what?’22 This would seem to justify Nietzsche’s claim that ‘The goal
of science is the destruction of the world.’23
THE EGYPTIANISM OF MODERN SCIENCE
The full  extent  of  the  Egyptianism of  science is  evident  in views expressed  by
Einstein. Einstein remarked that ‘It is a characteristic of thought in physics … that it
endeavours in principle to make do with “space-like” concepts  alone,  and strives to
express with their aid all relations having the form of laws.’ He argued that it is natural
19 As Andrew Bowie has  argued. See  Aesthetics  and subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche,  2nd ed. Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 2003.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche,  The Genealogy of Morals, tr. Francis Golffing, New York, Doubleday, 1956, Third
Essay, XXV, p. 291f.
21 See Arran Gare,  Nihilism Incorporated: European Civilization and Environmental Destruction, Bungendore, Eco-
Logical Press, 1993, Ch. 7. This book has been republished as the first part of Nihilism Inc.: Environmental
Destruction and the Metaphysics of Sustainability, Sydney, Eco-Logical Press, 1996.
22 Cited by Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, New York, W.W. Norton, 1975, p. 170.
23 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, p. 156n.
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‘to think of physical reality as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto, the
evolution  of a three-dimensional existence.’24 That is,  real  temporality,  temporality as
process of becoming and destruction, should not be countenanced,  or it  should be
treated as  a mere illusion.  Einstein was espousing what became the orthodox view
within  science.25 Hermann  Weyl,  a  major  theoretical  physicist  of  the  following
generation, followed Einstein and simply asserted as fact that ‘The objective world
simply  is,  it  does not  happen.’26 Quantum theory did  not really  change this  way of
thinking much. As Paul Davies wrote with reference to quantum theory, ‘the [post-
classical] physicist’s image of reality is rooted in a sort of meta-universe of mathematical
objects and relationships that are concrete, eternal and totally dependable, while the
Universe is nebulous, shifting and unpredictable.’27 That Einstein and other theoretical
physicists in their  search for the underlying unity behind appearances have denied
reality to temporal becoming is highly significant. It was they who provided theoretical
insights that made nuclear weapons a possibility. And yet these physicists were no evil
genii. Their work could be regarded as the fulfilment of a long tradition of thought. The
conception of a four dimensional world echoed the views of the eighteenth century
mathematical  physicist,  Lagrange,  who  argued  that  the  time  variable  of  rational
mechanics  based  on  Newton’s  laws  of  motion  could  be  regarded  as  the  fourth
dimension of space. G.J. Whitrow, commenting on this in The Natural Philosophy of Time,
noted that ‘By regarding physical time as a fourth dimension of space, Lagrange all but
eliminated time from dynamical theory.’28 In doing so, Lagrange was making explicit
what had already been implicit in Newton. Alexandre Koyré argued that Newton’s
conception of motion as a state had virtually denied its reality, and along with it, time.
In  Newtonian  Studies  he  pointed  out  that  ‘The  “motion”  of  geometrical  bodies  in
geometrical space changes nothing at all; the “places” in such a space are equivalent
and even identical. It is a changeless change. … It is a timeless motion … or … a
motion in timeless time—a notion as paradoxical as that of changeless change.’29 
While change was denied to ultimate reality and an ideal was upheld of knowledge
in a form which would give no place to time, in practice science has had to accept its
limitations in this regard. Particularly at the intermediate level of everyday life the large
number of interacting components has made unpredictable change ubiquitous. Science
has dealt with this by showing how unpredictability of details can nevertheless generate
statistical regularities. For the most part, the use of statistics is seen as a compromise
with the ideal of absolute knowledge of a reality in which there is no real becoming,
24 Albert Einstein,  Relativity: The Special and the General Theory,  tr. Robert W. Lawson, New York, Crown
Trade Paperbacks, 1961, p. 141.
25 On this see Čapek, ‘The Myth of Frozen Passage’.
26 Hermann Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science,  Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949,
p.116. Similar views were expressed by James Jeans and Kurt Gödel.
27 Paul Davies, ‘Law and Order in the Universe,’ New Scientist, 1634 (Oct. 15th, 1988), pp. 58-60, p. 60.
28 G. J. Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon, 1980, p. 3.
29 Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time, p. 10f.
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useful because of the impossibility of detailed knowledge of ultimate reality. However,
the  introduction of  statistics  has  provided  the  means,  when combined  with  more
traditional ideals of scientific knowledge, of explaining more complex features of the
world in which we live. Evolution, it is believed, can be explained as the outcome of a
combination of statistical analyzable variations and rates of survival and deterministic
physical and chemical laws characterizing how organisms pass on ‘information’ to their
progeny and how this ‘information’ determines the growth of organisms.30 Our own
existence is then accounted for in this way, or so it is believed by orthodox scientists. 
However, as noted, ‘explanation’ here really means explaining away, showing that
what appeared to be entities existing in their own right are really nothing but the effects
of their constituents and environments, and ultimately are mere appearances (to what?)
of the basic existents or existent of the universe. As G. Spencer Brown noted:
To  explain,  literally to lay  out  in a  plane  where particulars  can be readily  seen.
Thus to  place  or  plan  in  flat  land,  sacrificing other  dimensions  for  the sake  of
appearance. Thus to expound or put out at the cost of ignoring the reality or richness
of what is so put out. Thus to take a view away from its prime reality or royalty, or
to gain knowledge and lose the kingdom.31 
Where does this lead? Émile Meyerson argued that ‘scientific explanation actually ends
up dissolving the external world into undifferentiated space.’32 Elaborating on this, he
wrote:
[D]iversity  in  space  is  unquestionably  an  enigma  for  us,  a  grounds  for
astonishment if not identical, at least very similar to that we discover in the case
of diversity in time. As a consequence we cannot escape the conclusion that if
our reasoning is correct, the goal of explanations and theories is really to replace
the infinitely  diverse  world  around  us  by  identity  in  time  and  space,  which
clearly can only be space itself.33
POST-EGYPTIAN SCIENCE?
Not all scientists are wedded to this Egyptianism, however, and recently there has
been  a  concerted  effort  to  give  a  place  to  real  becoming  associated  with  the
development of complexity theory, the effort to understand ‘organized complexity’. In
1980, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences  was published, a
work in which Ilya Prigogine attempted to convey to the reader his ‘conviction that we
are in a period of scientific revolution—one in which the very position and meaning of
the scientific approach are undergoing re-appraisal—a period not unlike the birth of
30 For a popular exposition of this explanation of life see Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, New York,
Norton, 1987.
31 G. Spencer Brown, Laws of Form, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1969, p. 126n.
32 Émile Meyerson,  Explanation  in  the  Sciences,  tr.  Mary-Alice and  David A.  Sipfle,  Dordrecht,  Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991, p. 1.
33 Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, p. 136f.
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the scientific approach in ancient Greece or of its renaissance in the time of Galileo.’34
Clarifying this, Prigogine proclaimed:
Since the beginning of Western science, we have believed in the “simplicity” of
the  microscopic—molecules,  atoms,  elementary  particles.  Irreversibility  and
evolution  appear,  then,  as  illusions  related  to  the  complexity  of  collective
behaviour of intrinsically simple objects. This conception—historically one of the
driving  forces  of  Western  science—can  hardly  be  maintained  today.  The
elementary  particles  that we know are complex objects that can be produced
and can decay. … [T]here is a second reason why I am convinced that we are in
the middle of a scientific revolution. The classical, often called “Galilean” view
of science was to regard the world as an “object,” to try to describe the physical
world as if it were being seen from the outside as an object of analysis to which
we do not belong. This attitude has been immensely successful in the past. But
we have reached the limit of this Galilean view. To progress further, we must
have a better understanding of our position, the point of view from which we
start our description of the physical universe.35 
Prigogine argued that this revolution involves taking time seriously. The book begins
with the sentence, ‘This book is about time’ which he characterized as ‘the Forgotten
Dimension’. What he meant by claiming that time is the forgotten dimension is that in
classical science,  time appears as a mere ‘geometrical parameter.’36 In place of this,
Prigogine argued, we need a conception of time which involves irreversibility with an
asymmetric  relation  between the  past  and  the  future  and which  gives  a  place to
evolution towards greater complexity. As Prigogine and Stengers noted in Order out of
Chaos,  ‘On  every  scale  self-organization,  complexity,  and  time  play  a  new  and
unexpected  role.’37 We  must  recognize  that  we,  with  out  experience  of  time  as
becoming, are part of the world we are trying to comprehend. This means that science
must now be allied to the humanities, which have always stressed the reality of creative
becoming. 
In  making  this  argument,  Prigogine  and Stengers  aligned  themselves  with  the
philosophies of  Bergson  and Whitehead,  and contextualized  historically Prigogine’s
own work in chemical thermodynamics. Prigogine developed the notion of ‘dissipative
structures’, ‘structures’ which develop by dissipating entropy to increase the rate at
which entropy is produced, as a way to bridge the gap between the physical and the
biological  sciences:  life  forms  can  be  conceived  as  essentially  complex  dissipative
structures feeding on negative entropy (or exergy). Prigogine’s work was taken up and
had a major influence on the development of complexity theory,  and his work was
welcomed by members of the tradition of process metaphysics. However, most of those
34 Ilya Prigogine,  From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences, San Francisco, W. H.
Freeman, 1980.
35 Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, p. xiii, xv.
36 ibid., p. xi.
37 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man’s Dialogue with Nature, Toronto, Bantam Books,
1985.
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engaged in complexity theory have ignored the deeper philosophical implications of his
position.  For many such theorists,  complexity  theory is  treated  as  an extension of
mainstream reductionist science to deal with organized complexity, that is, organization
generated by the interaction between large numbers of components, and involves no
fundamental break with traditional science.38 Even if it is accepted that there is some
form  of  emergence  and  that  developments  in  complexity  theory  show  that  it  is
impossible to completely predict the future,  this is  only at the level of  appearance.
Reality itself is still  treated as the deterministic behaviour of components.  Prigogine
himself  was ambiguous on this  point.  In  From Being to  Becoming  he argued that  the
illusion of determinism is generated by the use of mathematical idealizations that go
beyond the possibilities of measurement.39 This argument is not developed, however,
and in Order out of Chaos Prigogine and Stengers suggested that ‘God could, if he wished
to,  calculate  the  trajectories  in  an  unstable  dynamic  world.’40 This  implies  that
creativity in the universe is mere appearance generated by our own limited cognitive
capacities. 
This suggests that even those who are struggling to overcome the Egyptianism of
science have great difficulty freeing themselves from its basic assumptions. 
THE ROOTS OF THE EGYPTIANISM OF SCIENCE
What then are these assumptions? And what is their source? To begin with, the
revival of mathematics as the basis for describing and explaining all that exists appears
to be a major component of and possible source of this Egyptianism. Does this mean
that as long as mathematics is taken as the basis for interpreting the world then we can
give no place to creative becoming? And why does mathematics have such an exalted
place within science? Was it the founders of modern science who put these assumptions
in place?
Nicholas Cusanus, Copernicus, Bruno, Kepler, Galileo, Gassendi, Descartes, Boyle
and Newton are usually taken as the major figures in the birth of modern science. Of
these, Descartes stands out as ‘the true legislator of modern science’, as Meyerson put
it.41 Descartes claimed to be starting afresh, building knowledge on new foundations. It
was he who claimed to be ushering in a revolution in thought, and thereby who is most
responsible for the idea of the seventeenth century scientific revolution. And it was the
ideas and problems generated by his philosophy that were the point of departure for
almost all subsequent developments in science and philosophy. And in Descartes the
motivations were clear. He wanted to create a conception of  the world that would
38 See Arran Gare, ‘Systems Theory and Complexity’,  Democracy and Nature, Vol. 6 No. 3, 2000:  pp. 327-
339.
39 Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, p. 215.
40 Prigogine and Stengers, Order out of Chaos, p. 271f. It is not clear from the context whether Prigogine and
Stengers are upholding this view or merely explicating the common view of science.
41 Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, p. 135.
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overcome the strife that Renaissance culture, he believed, was unable to deal with. 42 He
was concerned to promote a form of knowledge that would enable us to master nature
and to  create  a  stable  social order—a ‘cosmopolis’.  It  was this  that  provided  the
motivation  to  embrace  mathematics  as  a  model  of  permanence  and  clarity.  In
particular,  he  was concerned  to  deploy  analytical  geometry,  that  is,  the algebraic
representation  of  geometry.  To  such  ends  Descartes  developed  a  complete
metaphysical system which both gave and provided justification for the primary role of
mathematics in gaining knowledge of the physical world. Descartes reconceived the
nature  of  the  physical  world  to  justify  his  claim  that  it  could be  known through
mathematics, to this end virtually identifying matter and space. He also reconceived
rationality on the basis of the kind of reason associated with mathematics. Arguments
were to be accepted only if they could be grasped as ‘clear and distinct ideas’. Descartes
believed  that  through such  clear  and  distinct  ideas  he  could  justify  belief  in  the
existence of a God who guaranteed the knowledge gained by investigating the world in
this way. While his dualism enabled him to give a place to the spontaneous actions of
individual minds, it was his analytic geometry, which underlay the development of the
calculus, which led to attempts to reduce ‘time’ to a dimension of space. Descartes’
conception of nature, modified to incorporate time as spatial dimension, was very close
to the position embraced by Einstein when he developed his general theory of relativity,
as Einstein fully appreciated,43 and underpinned Einstein’s conviction that ‘God does
not play dice’. All this would suggest that we can take Descartes and his commitment to
a mathematical understanding of nature as the source of the Egyptianism of modern
science. 
However, Descartes cannot be taken at face value as the originator of the scientific
revolution or the originator of the commitment to mathematics. Each of the founders of
modern science took a stand against  the prevailing neo-Aristotelian cosmology and
each had been concerned to revive interest in mathematics as a means to comprehend
nature.  They  differed  profoundly,  however,  in  their  philosophies  and  how  they
interpreted the role of mathematics. They differed in their characterizations of matter,
the physical and the corporeal, what they understood mathematics to be, and how
mathematics applied to each of these.44 Nicholas Cusanus who was responsible in the
fifteenth century for reviving Platonism, argued that all knowledge of the finite world is
gained by  establishing  ratios  or  proportions and that  mathematics  is  the  supreme
method for  examining these ratios,  identifying the  mathematical  with  the physical
produced through making what is ‘implicate’ within God (identified with the ‘infinite’)
‘explicate’ through ‘contraction’. Synthesising Nicholas Cusanus’ ideas with aspects of
Stoic physics, Bruno identified this God with matter which he took to be the source of
42 See Toulmin, Cosmopolis, esp. Ch. 2.
43 Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, p. 176f.
44 On this see Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1972, esp. Ch.
15.
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the physical,  identifying this with individual  corporeal  existents.45 Galileo was more
influenced by Terminist reflections on kinematics and the critical tradition of Italian
Aristotelianism  along  with  the  newly  rediscovered  work  of  Archimedes.46 Mainly
through  methodological  considerations  he  came  to  defend  atomism,  identifying
mathematics, the physical conceived as matter, and the corporeal, but then could not
account for why atoms should be bounded and indivisible.  To avoid this problem,
Gassendi  revived  the  ideas  of  the  ancient  Atomists  and  argued  for  a  complete
separation between the mathematical and the physical, but then could not show why
mathematics  is  applicable  at  all  to  understanding  atoms.  Descartes  identified  the
physical and matter, which was then also identified with mathematics as the res extensa,
but distinguished these from the corporeal. While Descartes claimed to be building his
knowledge from the ground up to allow only what could be known with certainty, in
fact he was developing his new philosophy in an effort to overcome the problems of his
predecessors, and as John Herman Randall has shown, his philosophy was a revival of
the ideas of St Augustine. 
It could be argued that while the picture of Descartes making a new beginning was
wrong, he was still the figure who finally provided the integrated philosophy that could
serve as the starting point for modern science. However, while Descartes’ philosophy
was enormously influential and seemed to have been vindicated by Einstein’s physics,
his ideas were hardly the last  word on the place of  mathematics in nature. In the
eighteenth century, Newtonian physics prevailed against Cartesian physics. Apart from
having advanced beyond Descartes by developing the calculus, Newton had identified
the physical with the corporeal, but argued that corporeal atoms were extended by an
independent existent, space, which was at the same time seen by him as the sensorium
of the Deity and the means through which He acted in the world, helping to change the
positions  of  corporeal  beings  though  ‘time’,  which  was  also  conceived  to  be  an
independent existent.47 The introduction of time as a dimension along with the calculus
enabled Newton to represent not only motion but also acceleration mathematically.
Opposing  Descartes’  philosophy,  Newton interpreted  his  work  partly  through  the
Aristotelian  Thomist  tradition  (the  tradition  inspired  by  St  Thomas  Aquinas)  as
investigating the basic principles or  archai  which formed the rational structure of the
world  of  ordinary  experience,  and  partly  through  the  Terminist  (or  Nominalist)
Aristotelianism  of  the  Ockamites  (followers  of  William  of  Ockham)  to  develop  a
deductive postulate system that could serve to represent and predict natural events.48
Leibniz then challenged Newtonian physics, offering a quite different interpretation of
physical existence and its relationship to mathematics.
45 Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, p. 131ff.
46 See John Herman Randall  Jr.,  ‘Padua Method and Greek Mathematics’ and ‘Galileo and the New
Science’ in The Career of Philosophy, Vol.1, New York, Columbia University Press, Bk Two, Ch.’s 11 and 13.
47 Newton to some extent disguised his real views. See Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, Ch. 18. See
also Ernan McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1978.
48 See Randall, The Career of Modern Philosophy, p. 365f. and Bk 1, Chap. 2.
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If  Descartes  is  dethroned  and recognized  as  only  one  of  a  number  of  major
philosophers associated with the so-called scientific revolution, and if  the school of
thought he generated, Cartesianism, was only one of a number of competing schools of
thought in the advance of what came retrospectively to be characterized as modern
science,  does  this  matter?  Can we  not  still  argue  that  it  was  the  commitment  to
understanding the world through mathematics that is the source of its Egyptianism?
Once we abandon the identification of  modern science with Descartes’ philosophy,
however, the relationship between mathematics, knowledge and Egyptianism becomes
far  less  clear.  Egyptianism  cannot  be  merely  identified  with  the  elevation  of
mathematics as a form of knowledge of the world. This is illustrated by Bruno who was
influenced by both Neoplatonism and Stoic physics. While defending and radicalizing
the  Copernican  revolution  (arguing  that  all  stars  are  suns,  each  with  their  own
inhabited  planets)  Bruno  criticized  what  he  took to  be  Copernicus’  excessive pre-
occupation with mathematics.49 He appeared to be concerned that the creativity of
nature be appreciated, in opposition to traditional Neoplatonism, identifying the One
with matter and arguing that matter should not be seen as mere potential to be formed
but should be seen as pregnant with forms.50 But this did not mean that Bruno was
opposed to Egyptianism. He also argued that ‘The universe is, therefore, one, infinite
and immobile. … It has no local movement since there is nothing outside of it to which
it can be moved, given that it is the whole.’51 Leibniz, on the other hand, did place
more reliance on mathematics as a means to understand nature, and criticized Newton
for  being  insufficiently  committed  to  showing  how the  whole of  nature  could  be
understood deterministically, without invoking the continual activity of God. But at the
same time, Leibniz was concerned to give a place to creative becoming, even while
upholding  determinism,  and  helped  inaugurate  the  tradition  of  thought  which
eventually led to more radical questioning of science’s Egyptianism.
So  while  there  appears  to  be  a  close  relationship  between  mathematics  and
Egyptianism which had a major influence on the subsequent development of science,
neither the birth of modern science nor the embracing of mathematics as a means to
comprehend the  cosmos  can  be  identified  with  Egyptianism.  To  understand  the
impulse to Egyptianism it  is not enough to go back to Descartes and the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century. It is necessary to dig deeper to expose its roots
and reveal more precisely how these roots developed into modern science. One possible
source of Egyptianism is Christianity. Christianity has been characterized by exaltation
of that which is eternal and correspondingly, the denigration of the temporal realm. St.
Augustine, who as we noted exerted a major influence on Descartes, had argued that
the education of humanity though history consists in humanity leaning to abjure the
49 See Hilary Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance Science, Ithaca, Cornel University Press, p. 72.
50 Giordano  Bruno,  Cause,  Principle  and  Unity,  Fifth  Dialogue,  tr.  Richard  J.  Blackwell,  Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 61.
51 Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, p. 87.
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temporal and to live for what is eternal.52 But where did this celebration of the eternal
come from? It did not come from the Judaic conception of God. The Judaic God of the
Old Testament  was a  jealous,  irascible,  vindictive, all  powerful person acting as  a
temporal agent, not a timeless source of an illusory temporal world. It was only when
Judaic  thought was  interpreted  through  Greek  philosophy  that  God  came  to  be
identified with the eternal. So while intellectual developments in medieval Christianity
might have been a major source of influence on modern science, it is to Ancient Greek
thought that we must look for the source of Egyptianism and its relation to mathematics
and to understand the background to the philosophical disputes which gave rise to
modern science. 
THE ORIGINS OF EGYPTIANISM IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY: FROM
ANAXIMANDER TO PARMENIDES VIA PYTHAGORAS
It  was  Pythagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans  who  most  famously  promoted
mathematics as the way to knowledge in the ancient world and whose ideas were
supposedly revived with modern science. Was Pythagoras the source of Egyptianism?
According to Iamblichus, Pythagoras had followed the advice of his teacher, and gone
to Egypt, where he studied astronomy, geometry and the mysteries of the Gods.53 He
gave a new meaning to theoria, which had earlier meant ‘curiosity’, reinterpreting this as
‘the passionless contemplation of unchanging truth’.54 It was Pythagoras who first used
the term ‘philosophia’ and endowed it with a strong religious and ethical sense associated
with  theoria. Pythagoras also took up and developed the notion of ‘kosmos’, which he
conceived to be the universe as ordered by mathematical proportions (harmonia). This
view was based on his belief that the basic principle or  arche  of all things is number
(arithmos), as had been revealed to be the case in tuned strings. Ethics was understood as
restoring  cosmic  harmony  in  the  soul  (katharsis).  Pythagoras  strongly  influenced
Parmenides who went on to argue ‘that if something exists, it cannot come to be or
perish, change or move, nor be subject to any imperfection.’55 Subsequent philosophy
can be understood as a development of the ideas of these thinkers. As an anonymous
biographer of Pythagoras wrote: ‘Plato was the pupil of Archytas, and thus the ninth in
succession from Pythagoras; the tenth was Aristotle. … Plato is said to have learned his
speculative  and  physical  doctrines  from  the  Italian  Pythagoreans, his  ethics  from
Socrates, and his logic from Zeno, Parmenides and the Eleatics. But all these teachings
descended  from  Pythagoras.’56 Kenneth  Sylvan  Guthrie,  in  the  forward  to  The
52 Saint Augustine The City of God, tr. Marcus Dodds, New York, Random House, 1950, Bk 10, Ch. 14
53 Iamblichus, ‘The Life of Pythagoras’ in The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library, tr. Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie,
Grand Rapids, Phanes Press, 1987, p. 61.
54 F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy’, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 200.
55 G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield,  The Aristocratic Philosophers,  2nd ed. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1983, p. 241.
56 Anonymous, ‘The Life of Pythagoras Preserved by Photinus’ in Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p. 136,
137.
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Pythagorean  Sourcebook  claimed  that  ‘Neoplatonism  is  to  a  very  large  degree
Neopythagorean: it shares the typical interests in theosophy, cosmology, arithmology,
speculative music, and exotic religion. In fact, just as Platonists regard Aristotle as a
rather limited successor to their master, so Pythagoreans may well regard the Divine
Plato.’57 Given the subsequent influence of Neoplatonism on Christianity, it would seem
that here we have finally found the ultimate source of the Egyptianism of philosophy
that has permeated European civilization. 
Unfortunately,  ascertaining  and  comprehending Pythagoras’  views  and  how
Parmenides was influenced by Pythagorean thought, and the subsequent influence of
these ideas is far more difficult to ascertain than this sketch would suggest.58 Pythagoras
wrote nothing, and enjoined his followers not to write anything of their beliefs. Later,
most of Pythagoras’ followers were murdered, and Pythagoras died soon after. Those
later Pythagoreans who did write down their views were to some extent heretics and
therefore hardly reliable guides to Pythagorean doctrines, and were likely to have been
influenced by later philosophers; most importantly,  Parmenides. So to interpret and
judge Pythagorean philosophy and its contribution to Egyptianism it is necessary to see
these in the context of Greek thought more generally. In particular, it is necessary to
understand  Pythagorean  ideas  in  relation  to  the  ideas  of  Anaximander,  the  first
philosopher to make a comprehensive and detailed attempt to explain all aspects of the
universe. 
It was Anaximander who originated the idea of the cosmos, and it was probably he
who first deployed the term kosmos to characterize this.59 It appears that Anaximander
was also the first thinker to propose what became the standard form of explanation for
the cosmos, first, postulating an undifferentiated unity, secondly, arguing that from this
unity  two opposite powers  are  separated out  to  form the world order  and thirdly,
showing how these two opposites unite again to generate life. Anaximander postulated
the apeiron  or ‘unlimited’ as the all-enfolding and all-controlling, divine and immortal
and  indestructible  source  of  the  world.  An  absolute  reference  point  beyond  the
changing world in which we live had been postulated and divinized—without any
reference to mathematics. From this emerged the polar opposites, on the one hand,
hot,  dry,  bright  and rare,  on  the  other,  cold,  damp,  dark and  dense.  It  was  the
interaction  between  these  that  generated  the  diversity  of  the  cosmos,  the  celestial
bodies, meteorological phenomena, the sea and dry land, animal life and humans. In
characterizing  celestial  bodies,  Anaximander  was  the  first  mathematical  physicist
outside Babylon and given the dimensions he postulated, evidently believed that the
57 Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p. 13.
58 On this, see F. M. Cornford, ‘Mysticism and Science in the Pythagorean Tradition’ and Charles H.
Kahn, ‘Pythagorean Philosophy before Plato’ in The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alexander
P. D. Mourelatos, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993. 
59 See Charles H. Kahn,  Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology,  (1960) Indianapolis, Hackett, 1994,
Appendix I.
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universe was governed by simple mathematical ratios.60 On this basis he argued that
‘The earth is  aloft,  not  dominated by anything;  it  remains in place because of  the
similar distance from all  points [of the celestial circumference].’61 This, as noted by
Kahn, involved a new form of mathematical reasoning. It is, as he put it, ‘a general
expression for the principle of symmetry or indifference. It is indeed the same notion
which was glorified in modern time by Leibniz as his Principle of Sufficient Reason,
according to which everything which is true or real implies a reason why it is so and not
otherwise.’62 But  outside the celestial  realm, and despite  reference to  the immortal
apeiron,  the  kosmos was conceived by Anaximander as dynamic and historical. Here,
mathematical reasoning had at most a very subordinate position. Life had evolved and
was continuing to evolve. The first living beings had emerged in moisture and migrated
to drier parts, and humans had evolved from fish. 
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans appear to have accepted the basic structure of
Anaximander’s cosmology, but radically extended the place accorded to mathematics.
While the Pythagoreans built  on the mathematics  developed by  the Egyptians and
Babylonians and by Thales and Anaximander, according to Proclus, it was they who
developed it as a systematic body of knowledge ‘seeking its first principles in ultimate
ideas, and investigating its theorems abstractly and in a purely intellectual way.’63 While
the basic principle and root of all things was taken to be number, the basic principle
and root (arche) of number is the Monad or Unity. ‘One’ was not taken to be a number,
but as the principle underlying number conceived as diversity,  which in turn is the
condition  for  achieving  relations  between  diversity.  That  is,  the  triadic  form  of
explanation of the cosmos was taken over from Anaximander, but was conceived in
mathematical terms. As Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie put it, ‘If One represents the principle
of  Unity  from which all  things arise,  then Two, the Dyad,  represents  Duality,  the
beginning of multiplicity,  the beginning of strife, yet also the possibility of  logos,  the
relation of one thing to another.’64 In the movement from one to two to three to four
we have a return to unity of the  tetractys of the Decad (an equilateral triangle of ten
dots), which was taken to be perfect and to embrace the whole of nature. For instance
One represents the point, Two represent the line, Three represents the surface, and
Four the tetrahedron, the first three dimensional form, the Tetraktys representing this
emerging multiplicity from unity as the unity of the Decad. So, as Theon of Smyrna
put it, ‘the Decad determines every number, including the nature of everything, of the
even and the odd, of the mobile and immobile, of good and evil.’65 The Decad was
identified with kosmos (conceived as ‘world-order’), essentially a mathematic harmony.
There  was  no  distinction  between  physical  bodies  and  ideal  mathematical
60 Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, p. 96f.
61 Quoted ibid., p. 76.
62 ibid., p. 77.
63 Cited by Marshall  Clagett,  Greek Science in Antiquity,  2nd ed. [1963], Princeton Junction, The Scholar’s
Bookshelf, 1988, p. 36.
64 Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p. 21.
65 ibid., p. 171.
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constructions, or between rigid geometrical form and the vital processes of living things;
numbers  were thought to  be  separated by breathing in  spirit  and void out of  the
unlimited.66 With this doctrine the Pythagoreans were led to examine the relationships
of  numbers  and  geometrical  forms  as  a  means  to  investigate  the  entire  cosmos,
extending  Anaximander’s  notion  that  everything  that  is  true  or  real  requires  a
‘sufficient reason’ to explain why it is so and not otherwise. However, not everything
was explained by the Pythagoreans in this way. Much of Pythagorean doctrine appears
almost arbitrary, as when Pythagoras said that the human soul was a tetragon with
right angles.67 It is against the background of Pythagorean insights and arbitrariness
that we can understand the ideas of Parmenides and Zeno. 
Parmenides, taking the principle of sufficient reason to its extreme and focusing on
what is intelligible concluded that there is simply the One or unity of Being; he argued
that there was no development of diversity from the One and so no harmonizing of the
diverse. Such would imply coming into being and ceasing to be. Since this assumes that
we can know a prior state of  not being, which is  by  definition not,  and therefore
unknowable, this is unintelligible, Parmenides argued. The only secure way to truth is
that  which concerns what ‘is’, and this cannot come to be or perish, change or move,
nor be subject to imperfection. So, from postulating more abstract entities and charting
new notions of intelligibility in comprehending these abstract entities and their relations
pioneered by Anaximander and developed by Pythagoras, Parmenides focused on this
abstract realm of thought and what is intelligible and concluded that the world that we
normally take to be reality is merely the opinion of men. This did not stop him going
on to elaborate a whole cosmology,  portraying the cosmos as developing out of the
opposition between light and night, but at the same time he denigrated such accounts
as nothing but inventions of  the human mind. Parmenides defended his claims by
showing the logical coherence of  his ideas and that  the alternatives to them led to
contradictions. This was the origin of logic (as ‘dialectic’), which was further developed
by Parmenides’ student,  Zeno, who used it to show the incoherence of believing in
plurality  or  motion.  Parmenides’  arguments  were  based  on  two  assumptions:  that
logically true things and properties of real things coincide, and that any proposition is
either true or false; there can be no third case.68 Both of these assumptions came to be
accepted and have pervaded thought ever since (although each assumption has been
questioned).
HERACLITUS VERSUS THE PYTHAGOREANS AND PARMENIDES
While this account schematically describes the development of Egyptianism, it is
66 Aristotle, Physics, 213 b22.
67 Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p. 179.
68 For an analysis of Parmenides’ and Zeno’s arguments, see George Kampis, Self-Modifying Systems in Biology
and  Cognitive  Science:  A  New  Framework  A  New  Framework  for  Dynamics,  Information  and  Complexity,  Oxford,
Pergamon Press, 1991, p. 84ff.
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the response to Pythagoras and Parmenides which most clearly reveals the commitment
to the assumptions which gave rise to it. 
To begin with,  there was  some opposition to  this  trend of  thought.  The most
significant of this came from Heraclitus and is followers. Heraclitus, as Charles Kahn
has noted,69 was more concerned with the human condition than with the physical
world that had preoccupied his predecessors (although insofar as he was concerned
with the physical world he was closer to  Anaximander than to  later philosophers).
Developing a philosophy adequate to this, he attacked Pythagoras and developed a
philosophy focusing on change, life and death, almost totally contrary to the philosophy
of Parmenides. Even Heraclitus contributed to Egyptianism, however. He argued that
men should try to comprehend the underlying coherence of things. This, he argued, is
expressed in the logos, the element of arrangement common to all. As Kirk et. al. wrote
of this, ‘The effect of arrangement according to a common plan or measure is that all
things, although apparently plural and totally discrete, are really united in a coherent
complex of  which  men themselves are a part,  and the comprehension of  which is
therefore  logically  necessary  for  the  adequate  enactment  of  our  own lives.’70 This
appears  to  be  consonant  with  the  Pythagoreans.  Heraclitus’  logos,  however,  was
characterized not so much as a harmony but as a unity of opposites of various kinds.
Opposites  inhere  in  or  are  simultaneously  produced  by  a  single  subject,  or  are
connected through being different stages in a single invariable process. Each pair of
opposites  forms  both  a  unity  and a  plurality  and different  parts are  found to  be
interconnected.  This  unity  is  beneath  the  surface,  and  depends  upon a  balanced
reaction between opposites, as in the bow and the lyre. That is, the opposites are active
forces. Balance in the  cosmos is  maintained only  though unending ‘strife’  between
opposites. As Heraclitus put it, ‘[i]t is necessary to know that war is common and right
is strife and that all things happen by strife and necessity.’71 Through the balance of
opposing forces,  there  can  be  temporary  stability,  but  underlying  such  apparent
stability is  change. So, Heraclitus proclaimed: ‘Upon those that step into the same
rivers,  different  and different  waters  flow … They scatter  and … gather … come
together and flow away … approach and depart.’72 The world is then seen as an ever-
living fire: ‘This world-order… did none of gods or men make, but it always was and is
and shall be: an everliving fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures. … All
things are an equal exchange for fire and all fire for all things, as goods are for gold and
gold for goods.’73
Heraclitus’ efforts to uphold the primary reality of becoming, conflict and process
were rejected by most subsequent philosophers, while despite the apparent absurdity of
the conclusions defended by Parmenides and Zeno, subsequent philosophers accepted
69 See Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
70 Kirk et. al. The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 187f.
71 ibid., p. 190.
72 ibid., p. 195.
73 ibid., p. 198.
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that  there was something fundamentally  right in their  arguments.  Even  when they
opposed their  conclusions,  they accepted that  what  is  known must  be unchanging.
Embracing the central argument of Parmenides while modifying his position to account
for the appearance of change, the atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, postulated a
plurality of unchanging plenums or atoms of different shapes and sizes within a void,
that is,  what is and what is  not,  taking the void, ‘what is  not’,  to exist,  so making
intelligible the movement of atoms in relation to each other.74 Shape, arrangement and
position,  identified  with  ‘rhythm,  touching  and  turning’  were  taken  to  be  the
‘differences’ (i.e. what could be different) which are the ‘causes’ of other things. Later
Pythagoreans modified  Pythagorean ideas  to  accord  at  least  to  some  extent  with
Parmenides’ philosophy. Archytas, a contemporary of Plato, extolled logic, writing of it
that compared to the other sciences ‘it is by far the most successful and succeeds in
demonstrating  its  objectives  even  better  than  geometry.  Where  geometric
demonstration fails, logic succeeds…’75 He went on to claim that it is impossible for
opinions if they are true to contradict each other, implicitly rejecting Heraclitus’ claim
that contradictory assertions are true. Another Pythagorean, Ocellus Lucanus argued
in Parmenidian fashion that the universe cannot have begun, nor can it end, ‘For if
some one should  claim that  it  was once  generated,  he would not  be able  to  find
anything into which it can be corrupted and dissolved, since that from which it was
generated would be the first part of the universe; and again that into which it would be
dissolved  would  be  the  last  part  of  it.’76 Parmenides  argument  that  the  One  is
undifferentiated was rejected, but his arguments still led to a more static conception of
the diversity that was acknowledged. In opposition to Anaximander’s evolutionary view
of the cosmos, Ocellus argued that ‘Man’s generation did not originate from the earth,
other animals, or plants… As primarily the world existed always, its parts must coexist
with it…’77 
PLATO
It is in Plato’s work, however, that we can most clearly see the working out of the
opposition between Parmenidian and Heraclitean thought. Plato was influenced by and
responded  to  all  these  thinkers;  to  the  Heraclitean  Cratylus,  the  Pythagoreans,
Parmenides,  Socrates  who  himself  was  influenced  by  both  the  Pythagoreans and
Parmenides, and the atomists; the study of his work therefore provides the best vantage
point to understand the underlying assumptions of Greek culture. To begin with, Plato
developed Socratic logic or dialectics, which in turn was a development of the logic of
Parmenides  and Zeno. Following Socrates, Plato used this  logic  to  search for  true
definitions,  extending  the  examination  of  these  and  their  relationships  beyond
74 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 985b4. See Kirk et. al. The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 414.
75 ‘The Fragments of Archytas’ in Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p. 193.
76 Ocellus Lucanus, ‘On the Nature of the Universe’ in Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p. 203.
77 Ocellus Lucanus, ‘On the Nature of the Universe’, p. 208.
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mathematical definitions to ethical and political definitions. Plato took very seriously
Parmenides’  argument that  that which is  not,  cannot  be known because it  has no
object, and therefore there can be no coming to be or change. His response to this,
presented in The Sophist, was to argue that when we claim that something is not, we do
not  mean that  it  is  not  anything, but that  it  is  one Kind and not another.  As he
concluded his argument, ‘When we speak of “that which is not”, I don’t think we mean
something contrary to what exists, but only something that is different.’78 But Plato still
accepted that  these  ‘things’  must  be  unchanging. Criticising  mathematicians  who
‘constantly talk of “operations’” like “squaring,” “applying,” “adding,” and so on. As if
the object were to  do  something,’ Plato argued that ‘the true purpose of the whole
subject is knowledge—knowledge, moreover, of what eternally exists, not of anything
that  comes  to  be  this  or  that  at  some  time  and  ceases  to  be.’79 Taking  such
mathematical objects as prototypical Plato took objects of knowledge to be incorporeal
and intelligible ‘forms’,  dismissing those  who  took material  bodies to  be  reality  as
vulgar.80 
These forms subsequently became the basis of his cosmology. In the prelude to
Timaeus he wrote:
What is that which is always real and has no becoming, and what is that which is
always becoming and is never real? That which is apprehensible by thought with
a rational account is the thing that is  always unchangeably real; whereas that
which is the object of belief together with irrational sensation is the thing that
becomes and passes away, but never has real being.81 
This did not mean that the realm of belief and becoming were to be dismissed entirely.
Becoming was  granted a  place  in  relation  to  agency, in  this  case,  of  the  eternal
Demiurge who had fashioned the universe using the  forms as  a  model.  While  an
account  of  what  is  abiding  will  itself  be  abiding,  Plato  argued,  where agency  is
concerned  it  is  only  possible  to  give  a  probable  account  (or  ‘likely  story’),  less
improbable than any other and so believable rather than knowable. As he put it, ‘as
being  is  to  becoming, so  truth  is  to  belief.’82 However, since  the  Demiurge  was
conceived to be good, it could be assumed that he would attempt to make the universe
as like himself  as possible.  For this reason, the universe to a considerable extent is
knowable through reason. Plato argued that the Demiurge had formed the receptacle
into five different kinds of polyhedrons, making air, fire, earth and water, the elements
from which the Demiurge brought the universe into being, ‘coming into concord by
means of proportion.’83 The fifth element was used by the Demiurge to arrange the
constellations of the whole heaven. On this basis Plato foreshadowed the mathematical
78 Plato, ‘The Sophist’, 257b. in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 1003.
79 Plato, The Republic, 527a-b.
80 Plato, The Sophist, 246a-e.
81 Plato, Timaeus, 27d-28a. tr. John Warrington, London, Dent, 1965.
82 ibid., 29c
83 ibid., 32c.
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treatment of time. He argued that while it was impossible to fully endow a generated
thing with eternity,  the Demiurge ‘planned to make as it were a moving likeness of
eternity; and, at the same time that he set in order the Heaven, he made, of eternity
that abides in unity, an ever-flowing likeness moving according to number—that to
which we have given the name Time.’84 
In  elaborating  this  philosophy  Plato  was  particularly concerned  to  defend  the
reality of  these forms against  the followers of  Heraclitus.  His argument against  the
Heracliteans was presented most forcefully in the dialogue Cratylus. Here, Plato argued
that if reality were taken to be process, then there could be no knowledge:
Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything
is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot
continue to be knowledge unless continuing to exist.  But if the very nature of
knowledge  changes,  at  the  time  when  the  change  occurs  there  will  be  no
knowledge,  and,  according  to  this  view,  there  will  be  no  one to  know and
nothing to know.85
What is amazing is that this appears to have been taken to be a good argument. Jaakko
Hintikka has offered an explanation for why this should have been so. He noticed that
the Greeks,  including Plato and Aristotle,  assume that  sentences  expressing human
knowledge are  temporally  indefinite;  they  depend on  some  feature  or  features  of  the
occasion on which they are uttered.86 Truth was not understood by them in relation to
a context independent proposition but to thoughts of people who uttered sentences.
This in turn was a manifestation of a deeper assumption, that knowledge is some kind
of perception or direct acquaintance with the objects of knowledge. As W.G. Runciman
concluded after  a  study  of  Plato’s  Theaetetus, ‘The  general  impression  left  by  the
Theaetetus  is that Plato continued to think of knowledge as a sort of mental seeing or
touching.’87 The consequence of this is that the Greeks simply assumed that we can
have genuine knowledge, that is, knowledge which continues to be knowledge, only of
what is eternal, or at least, changeless; that is, with that which is ‘omni-temporal’. 
We can now see the assumptions underlying Greek thought. To begin with, there
was the assumption which developed with Greek philosophy that a proper explanation
of anything involves supplying a sufficient reason why anything should happen, an
assumption was closely associated with the use of  mathematics. There were deeper
assumptions at work, however; to begin with, the assumption that we can only have
true knowledge of what is omni-temporal or eternal. This in turn was based on the
assumption that knowledge was ‘mental seeing or touching’. This is  the assumption
which accounts for the ascendancy in Greek thought of Egyptianism, for the movement
84 ibid., 37d.
85 Plato, Cratylus, 440a The Collected Dialogues of Plato.
86 Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known: Historical Perspectives in Epistemology, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1974, p.
51.
87 W. G. Runciman, Plato’s Later Epistemology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 52, cited by
Hintikka Knowledge and the Known, p. 59.
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from  the  omni-temporal  apeiron  of  Anaximander  to  the  mathematical  entities  and
relationships of the Pythagoreans to the unchanging Being of Parmenides, to the atoms
of Leucippus, then to the forms of Plato. It accounts for the emergence of the Principle
of Sufficient Reason. And it accounts at least in part for why even Heraclitus, who was
most concerned to acknowledge the reality of change, postulated the logos as the object
to  which  all  people  should  turn  to  discover  the  truth.  And  it  accounts  for  why
Heraclitus’ argument that all things flow and everything is changing, did not prevail.
Most importantly it accounts for the celebrated status accorded first to mathematics
and then to logic. 
FROM PLATO TO THE STOICS
If as Whitehead claimed,  ‘the European philosophical tradition … consists of  a
series of footnotes to Plato’,88 and if modern science involved a revival of Platonistic
thinking in opposition to scholastic Aristotelian thought, then we should now be able to
say that we have finally got to the roots of Egyptianism. The issue is still more complex,
however.  While  Platonistic  thought  might  have  provided  the  foundations  for  the
development of modern science, Plato’s own philosophy only provided a starting point
for the developments which led to this.  What we find subsequently is  a struggle to
simultaneously  uphold Egyptianism while still  giving  a  place  to  the appearance  of
becoming in the world. The tensions generated by these efforts resulted in a variety of
positions which contributed to laying the foundations for modern science.
This tension is clearly evident in Plato’s philosophy. To begin with, to some extent
echoing Parmenides, Plato extolled mathematical knowledge dealing with an eternal
realm of intelligible forms about which we learn through instruction, of which we can
be certain, and which can give a true account of itself,  and distinguished this from
another realm of existence about which we can have true beliefs which can give no
account of itself and which can be shaken by persuasion.89 Since the mathematical
forms apparent in the sensible world are mere copies of the intelligible forms, the only
kind of knowledge attainable in this case is ‘true belief’, which for Plato was the ‘most
probable account’. That is, all that we can hope for is to gain true beliefs about the
sensible world, beliefs less improbable than any other. While mathematics was being
organized into a coherent body of knowledge founded on basic principles (completed in
geometry with the work of Euclid), Plato rejected this approach to cosmogony, claiming
that it was not only too difficult  to use such a method of exposition to explain the
generation of the cosmos, but exclaimed: ‘Nor indeed could I ever convince myself that
I should do right in shouldering so great a task.’90 Aiming only at a probable account
enabled Plato to include in his explanations reasons for acting by the Demiurge and the
88 Alfred North Whitehead,  Process and Reality,  Corrected Edition, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W.
Sherburne, New York and London, The Free Press, 1978.
89 Plato, Timaeus, 51c-e.
90 ibid., 48d.
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lesser gods, the forming of the otherwise featureless Receptacle on the model of the
forms, largely chaotic mechanical interactions, as when the elements interact with each
other and, with the exception of earth, are transformed into each other, or the elements
form compounds, and the cooperation of rational design and causal necessity associated
with organisms. But Plato had presented an idea of the highest form of knowledge,
presenting  his  ‘probable  account’  as  a  deficient  form  of  knowledge.  He  had  set
philosophy on a path to augment his ‘probable account’ to bring it closer to the highest
form of knowledge.
The first domain in which knowledge of the sensible world was developed to accord
with  the  ideal  achieved  by  mathematical  knowledge  was astronomy,  and  to  some
extent, to physics  generally. Plato’s  student and associate,  Eudoxus,  took up Plato’s
challenge  of  showing  by  ‘what  uniform  and  ordered  motions  can  the  apparent
movements of the planets by accounted for?’91 Eudoxus devised a system of concentric
spheres, all having their centre in the centre of the earth, revolving uniformly, but with
a number of such circular motions working on each planet. The whole system was a
purely geometrical hypothesis. Another student of Plato, Heraclides, suggested that the
phenomena could be saved more simply if it were supposed that the Earth revolved on
its axis while the heavens remained fixed, and that Mercury and Venus revolve around
the Sun. Half a century later, Aristarchus suggested that the Earth revolves around the
Sun, suggesting also that the stars were of immense distance from the Sun in order to
account for the absence of parallax. Here we have the application of a hypothetico-
deductive approach to ‘save the appearances’. Aristarchus also attempted to calculate
the size of and distances to the Sun and the Moon using observations and geometrical
calculations equivalent  to later trigonometric  calculations.  While poor observational
data  resulted  in  poor  results,  similar  methods  enabled  Eratosthenes,  a  friend  of
Archimedes, to accurately calculate the circumference of the earth. Such observations
go  beyond  the  hypothetic-deductive  approach  to  ‘save  appearances’  in  that  the
observations and observational equipment themselves presuppose a mathematical order
in  that  which  is  being investigated.  Plato’s  contemporary  Archytas  is  said  of  have
written ‘the first systematic treatise on mechanics based on mathematical principles.’92 
Such ideas were developed much further in Hellenistic science. To begin with, the
mathematical approach to mechanics were superseded by Aristotle’s more qualitative
approach, an approach which lacked formal mathematical demonstrations. But along
with further developments in mathematics, the mathematical approach was revived by
Euclid and Archimedes. One of the principle developments in mathematics was the
systematic application of a method of analysis and synthesis. Analysis commences with
the assumption of what is to be proved and then proceeds backwards by successive
inferences to theorems of axioms or postulates generally accepted or previously proved,
91 Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity, p. 109. This work provides a lucid account of the development of Greek
science.
92 ibid., p. 93.
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while synthesis is the reversal of this procedure, proceeding to the proof of the new
theorem.93 This  same  procedure  was  then  applied  to  mechanics  of  levers  and
hydrostatics,  using  idealized  geometrical  magnitudes.  The  importance  of  these
developments was to have shown that a similar approach could be taken to the world
around us as that taken in astronomy. This achievement, however, was at the cost of
abandoning the dynamic aspects of Aristotle’s work.
It might appear that Aristotle’s work and those he influenced countered at least to
some extent the advance of this Egyptianism and to some extent moved philosophy
back to the more dynamic cosmology of Anaximander. To begin with, Aristotle altered
the  status  of  mathematics.  For  Aristotle,  mathematics  was  nothing  more  than
perceptible things seen in abstraction from their perceptible qualities. Not only did he
deny that mathematical entities exist as such, he also argued that the domains in which
mathematics was of significance were far more limited than Plato had thought; it was
not universal method.94 Aristotle saw the universe as a hierarchy of forms with different
regions characterized by different qualities. Only in astronomy, optics, mechanics and
harmony is it  appropriate to use mathematics. Elsewhere, a more qualitative, more
empirical approach is required with different principles of explanation. As he put it:
‘Perceptible  things  require  perceptible  principles,  eternal  things  eternal  principles,
perishable things perishable principles; and, in general, every subject-matter principles
which are homogeneous with itself.’95 The transfer of one method of science to another
leads to ‘category-mistakes’. Aristotle argued that in the mundane world he accorded a
central place to the process of actualizing forms and to generation and corruption.96 
However, in other ways Aristotle took mathematics to be a more significant aspect
of reality than had Plato. As G.E.L. Owen noted, when Aristotle joined the Academy it
was distinguished from other schools by its interests in mathematics and dialectics. For
Plato, mathematics prepared people for the study of dialectics. Aristotle reversed the
priorities.97 For Aristotle,  mathematics  is  a  science  of  the physical  world,  not  of  a
Platonic  world of  transcendent  objects.  It  abstracts  from the  physical  world  those
aspects of the world relevant to physics. This is then the model of all sciences: it does
not  merely  record  but  explains,  and  in  explaining,  it  must  generalize.  With
mathematics conceived in this way, Aristotle could treat mathematical knowledge of the
physical  world as  the  highest  kind of  knowledge,  not  as  an  inferior  kind to  pure
mathematics  as  Plato  had  argued.  Aristotle  also  argued,  contrary  to  Plato,  that
93 While this method was most clearly spelt out by Pappus of Alexandria who lived at the end of the third
and the beginning of the fourth century AD, it is evident in Archimedes’ Letter to Eratosthenes’, The History
of Mathematics: A Reader, ed. John Fauvel and Jeremy Gray,  London, Macmillan Press, 1987, pp. 167-172. On
Pappus and Greek mathematics generally, see Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity, p. 72ff.
94 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 75a38 – b6.
95 Cited by S. Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity, [1962] Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1987, p. 34.
96 For an interpretation of Aristotle stressing his dynamic view of nature see John Herman Randall  Jr.,
Aristotle, New York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 
97 G. E. L. Owen, Aristotle, ‘Method, Physics and Cosmology’ in  Logic, Science and Dialectic,  ed. Martha
Nussbaum, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 151-164, p. 153.
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knowledge of the world could be presented as mathematics was being presented. He
argued that all  sciences,  whether  mathematical or  not,  should be developed into a
system in which theorems are validly derived from basic principles, (although he was
seldom able to achieve this goal). Dialectic was reconceived from Plato’s conception of
it as a free-ranging analysis, critique and development of definitions to an examination
of respectable opinions in order to arrive at the first principles of each of the sciences.98
This reconceptualization of the nature of knowledge of the world was associated
with the development of syllogistic logic. In The Sophist Plato had argued that ‘dialectic
[is] the science whose function is to divide according to Kinds, not believing that the
same form is a different one or vice versa’. He went on to suggest that 
…he who can do that intuitively perceives (a) one Form extended everywhere
throughout many, where each one lies apart, and (b) many Forms differing from
one another, included within one Form; and again (c) one Form connected in a
unity  through many  wholes,  and (d)  many  Forms  entirely  marked  off  apart.
Thus he knows  how to distinguish,  Kind by Kind, in what  ways  the several
Kinds are or are not able to combine.99
Aristotle developed this suggestion rigorously by characterizing knowledge in terms of
class membership. To describe nature exhaustively required comparison and definition.
An exhaustive definition required the identification of the closest genus and the specific
difference. The aim then  was to  characterize  the whole of  nature  in  terms of  an
unequivocal hierarchical order of definitions. 
On this basis Aristotle developed new forms of logic, an inductive logic concerned
with valid inferences  from observations of  individuals  or classes of  individuals,  and
deductive or syllogistic logic concerned with identifying what kinds of valid deductive
inferences can be made from assertions affirming or denying something of something to
conclusions which are different from the premises.100 In general,  Aristotle took such
assertions  to  be  ‘categorical sentences’,  that is,  assertions that  can be  expressed as
predicates of subjects or class membership, expressible in forms such as ‘a belongs to
every b’. This was a logic of terms. This logic not only provided Aristotle with a means
to organize knowledge within particular sciences, but also to organize knowledge of the
relationship between sciences. The ultimate classes or predicates are the categories. He
defined the science grappling with the most fundamental question, ‘What is “primary
being (ousia)”’? as first philosophy (i.e. metaphysics), because knowledge of this underlies
and is presupposed by all other sciences.101 Primary beings are those beings to which all
predicates must ultimately be predicated. Aristotle recognized three kinds of primary
beings:  sensible primary beings (a stone or tree,  for example),  non-sensible primary
beings subject to change (the celestial bodies),  and the highest kind, primary beings
98 See Aristotle, Topics, 101b4.
99 Plato, The Sophist, 253d.
100 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24.
101 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003b15-23.
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which  are  eternal  and  unchanging, the  ‘unmoved movers’.102 He  identified  these
unmoved movers with the fifty-five spheres which he claimed were required to move
the planets (including the sun and the moon).103 These were taken to be composed of a
fifth element, aether. The celestial realm was held by Aristotle to be eternal.
So despite the fact that Aristotle gave a place to diverse kinds of science, some of
which  involved generation  and  corruption,  all  these  were  organized  in  an  omni-
temporal structure of classes which provided the basis for developing and organizing
knowledge, which determined which inferences are valid and which provided the omni-
temporal  objects  required  for  genuine  knowledge.  And  the  ultimate  objects  of
knowledge are the unmoved movers, the spheres moving the planets. Aristotle differed
from  Plato  in  how he  contributed  to  Egyptianism.  Plato’s  Egyptianism based  on
transcendent,  omni-temporal  forms  had  been  abandoned  for  a  more  inclusive
Egyptianism which gave a greater place to mathematical knowledge of the sensible
world than Plato had allowed. 
There does appear to be one group of philosophers in the Ancient World who were
resolutely  opposed  to  Egyptianism,  the  Stoics.  These  were  the  most  influential
philosophers for half  a millennium from the 2nd century BC to the 3rd century AD,
although almost  all  the  most  original  ideas were  developed by  its  founders.  These
philosophers appear to have been influenced by Aristotle, but developed his ideas to
accord more with those of Heraclitus.104 Embracing the suggestion made by Plato, that
what is real is what can be affected or which can effect a change in something else,105
the Stoics took force to be the primary feature of physical existence. Essentially, they
put forward an early version of field theory in which the whole determines the parts.106
The universe was seen to begin from a state in which all is fire.107 This generates the
elements  (air,  fire,  earth and water)  from which  the  world we are  familiar  with is
created. This will end in fire and the whole cycle will start again. In this scheme of
things, the active elements fire and air (or the hot and the cold) form breath or pneuma,
the sustaining cause of all existing bodies. There are various kinds of  pneuma, and the
kinds associated with plants and animals guide the growth and development of animate
bodies. Pneuma acts, and is therefore conceived to be body, playing its role by blending
with matter. So what we appear to have is a world of dynamic process. Accordingly,
mathematics  was  seen  as  derivative  from  force  and given  a  subordinate  place  in
comprehending this  force.108 ‘Mathematics is  superficiary, as it  were, and builds on
102 ibid., 1069a30.
103 ibid., 1074a11.
104 That Stoicism derives from Aristotle’s philosophy has been argued by David E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic
Cosmology, Ohio State University Press, 1977.
105 Plato, The Sophist, 247d-e.
106 See S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, London, Routledge, 1959, p. 33ff. On Sambursky’s interpretation,
see F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics, London, Chatto & Winds, 1975, p. 71.
107 See A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol.1, Translation of the Principal Sources,
with Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 274ff. 
108 Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, p. 87. 
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someone else’s land’, wrote Seneca.109 Formal logic was also modified by the Stoic to
accord with their conception of the universe as dynamic process. In place of Aristotle’s
syllogistic  logic  they  developed  a  logic  of  propositions.  This  enabled  the  Stoics  to
accommodate verbs of all kinds, whereas the Aristotelian syllogism only admitted the
copula that joins a predicate to its subject.110 
The  Stoics,  however,  were  not  only  still  dominated  by  Egyptianism;  they
contributed to its development. Having accepted the mutability of the elements, they
concluded that  there  must  be some ultimate principles  underlying them:  God and
matter, the first being active, the second passive, without qualities, although extended
and resistant to pressure. As in Heraclitus, God is characterized as logos. This has two
meanings in Stoic philosophy; the first,  that of an eternal rational plan or principle
which guides the evolution of the universe; the second, combined with matter to form a
pneuma that passes through all things and fashions them in accordance with this plan.111
So despite the commitment to dynamic process, the ultimate principles are timeless.
Furthermore, in their determination to uphold a ‘materialist’ cosmology in which only
that which acts on others or can be acted upon is acknowledged to be real, the Stoics
collapsed the  diversity  of  sciences of  Aristotle  into  one  science. Dynamic process,
ultimately  controlled  by  God  as  plan  and  God  as  pneuma,  was  conceived  to  be
deterministic.  The Stoics rejected Aristotle’s  argument  that statements  about future
events can be allowed to be either true or false, and argued that before they happen,
such statements must be true or false even if we cannot know what is true until after the
event. Their acceptance of determinism based on their conception of God and His role
in the cosmos together with arguments based on logic led them to equate the causal
necessity of  dynamic processes with logical necessity. The cosmos was then seen to
repeat of circle of development and conflagration so that everything that happens in
each cycle will be repeated eternally.
MODERN SCIENCE AS HEIR TO GREEK EGYPTIANISM
Subsequent  to  the  foundation  of  the  main schools  of  thought philosophy was
characterized by rival traditions both competing and appropriating ideas from each
other. Neoplatonism was a synthesis of Plato’s diverse ideas with elements of Stoicism
and  Aristotelianism.  A  new  dimension  was  added  by  the  integration  of  these
philosophies with Hebraic thought in Christianity. The subsequent synthesis celebrated
the eternal as the true reality but at the same time promoted increasing interest in the
temporal  realm,  sharpening  the  opposition  between  the  Egyptian  tendencies  of
philosophy and the problematic status of change and becoming. The most  original
thinker  in the  effort  to  synthesise  Greek thought  and Platonism was St Augustine.
109 Seneca, Letters 88.25-8 in The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 160.
110 On Stoic logic, see F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics, London, Chatto & Winds, 1975, Ch. 5.
111 On this, see Sandbach, The Stoics, p. 72f.
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Augustine identified the Christian God with the realm of ideas of the Platonic tradition
and developed his theory of knowledge accordingly. As Randall wrote, 
God is the Truth which is the origin of all  truth.  Since mathematics and the
relations of figures and numbers form the clearest illustration of truth, God is the
realm of logical and mathematical subsistence. … Thus, the highest conception
of  Greek  science,  the  idea  of  a  Logos,  a  rational  structure  or  substance,  is
identified with the God of Christianity.112
But  at  the  same  time  St  Augustine  was  concerned with  the  temporal  order  and
developed highly original ideas on temporality which have recently been revived by
Paul  Ricoeur  in  his  effort  to  characterize  narrative.113 The  most  original  natural
philosopher of  Late  Antiquity,  John Philoponus, strove to adjust physical theory to
accord with Biblical account of creation.114 It was this that led him to criticize Aristotle’s
defence of an eternal world with a sharp division between the celestial and sublunary
worlds.115 John argued that all sensible things, including those in the celestial realm, are
mutable,  although some things  change  only  very  slowly. While this  led  him to be
skeptical about the efforts to understand nature, he developed the notion of ‘impetus’ to
account for the continued motion of the planets since creation. Such arguments, and
the notion of ‘impetus’,  were revived by the Terminists at Oxford and Paris in the
fourteenth century and through them had an important influence on the development
of modern science.116 
As noted, the rise of modern science was associated first and foremost with the rise
in status of mathematics. In general, as Alexandre Koyré among others have argued,
the revival of interest in mathematics was associated with a revival of Platonism and
Neoplatonism.117 Platonism was clearly important in the overthrow geocentricism in
astronomy. Copernicus, Bruno and Kepler were all strongly influenced by the revival
of Platonism and Neoplatonism.118 However, not all proponents of mathematics were
Platonists, and the Platonism of the early modern period differed from the Platonism of
the Ancient World. Kepler in particular, originally a Neoplatonist, later emphasized the
need  to  subordinate  mathematical  thinking  to  observation.  At  the  same  time,  the
Neoplatonism of  the  seventeenth century  upheld Egyptianism far  more  rigorously.
Why?  Because  Platonism  did  not  simply  replace  the  Aristotelianism  of  Scholastic
112 Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 27. 
113 Paul  Ricoeur,  Time and Narrative,  Vol.1, tr. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago and
London, 1984, pp. 5-30.
114 See S. Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 154
ff. Philoponus wrote in the first half of the sixth century A. D.
115 See Johannes Philoponus, ‘The unity of heaven and earth’ in  Physical Thought from the Presocratics to the
Quantum Physicists, ed. Shmuel Sambursky, New York, Pica Press, 1975.
116 On the contributions of the Terminists, see Edward Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1977. While Pierre Duhem argued that the Terminists were the true original
thinkers whose ideas were merely revived by Galileo, Grant argues that there was far less influence than
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117 See ‘Galileo and Plato’ in Metaphysics and Measurement, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968. 
118 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 128ff., 199.
ARRAN GARE 81
Philosophy; it incorporated Aristotelian Egyptianism into it as this had been developed
both by the Thomists and the Terminists, along with central doctrines of the Atomists
and the Stoics.
The place accorded  to  mathematics  in  the  new orientation  to  the  world  was
famously expressed by Galileo when he wrote:
Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes—I mean
the universe—but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language
and  grasp  the  symbols  in  which  it  is  written.  This  book  is  written  in  the
mathematical  language,  and  the  symbols  are  triangles,  circles,  and  other
geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single
word of it; without which one wanders through a dark labyrinth.119 
However, this  was as  much  rhetoric  as  the  statement  of  a  coherent  philosophical
position, and opposing the claims of Koyré that Galileo was a Platonist, John Herman
Randall  has argued that  Galileo was more influenced by  Aristotelian thought than
Platonism. Galileo’s point of departure was the Italian tradition of thought based in
Padua concerned to develop a more adequate method to investigate nature. This work
involved trying to comprehend and then generalize Aristotle’s approach to biology. In
his biological investigations, Aristotle began with effects,  sought the cause and then
explained  the  effects  by  that  cause.  The  Italians  characterized  this  as  the
‘resolutive/compositive’  method.  According  to  a  leading  figure  of  this  school,
Zabarella,  science  proceeds through four  stages:  first,  we observe the  single  effect,
secondly we resolve the complex fact into its component parts and conditions, thirdly
we examine this hypothetical  cause by mental  examination to clarify it and find its
essential  elements,  and  finally  we  demonstrate  the  effect  from  that  cause.120 This
method was seen to  provide  the  means for  establishing the first  principles  of  any
science. While Zabarella did not relate this method of investigation to mathematics,
and distinguished it  from  the  mathematical  method of  Archimedes,  his  successors
integrated  these  two.  In  general,  these  Italian  proponents  of  mathematics  were
Aristotelians rather than Platonists, seeing mathematical forms as discoverable in nature
through abstraction. And being artists and engineers, their main motive for extolling
mathematics was its practical utility. Leonardo da Vinci, for instance, who played a
major role in combining the resolutive/compositive method with mathematics, argued
that  ‘No  investigation  can  claim  to  be  a  true  science  if  it  does  not  proceed  by
mathematical demonstration.’121 This new model of  science was inherited and then
developed by Galileo, who at the same time, drawing on the conceptual work of the
Terminists (notably, Nicole Oresme and Jean Buridan) and the mathematical work and
approach to explanation of Archimedes, was able to go beyond the static thinking of
119 Opere  Complete  di  Galileo  Galilei,  Firenze,  1842,  ff.,  Vol.  IV,  p.171,  translated  by  E.  A.  Burtt,  The
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, revised ed., New York, Doubleday, 1954, p. 75.
120 On this, see Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 295. Randall argues against Koyré that Platonism as such
had only a slight influence on Galileo.
121 Quoted by Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 305.
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Archimedes by introducing the notion of  ‘state  of  motion’  and then characterizing
motion mathematically. However, for all his achievements, Galileo did not elaborate an
integrated cosmology and philosophy on this basis.
The  development  of  such  an  integrated  cosmology  and  philosophy  involved
drawing upon and integrating other traditions of thought. In particular, it involved a
synthesis of the project of the Terminists to create an unequivocal language to describe
reality and the revival of the Stoic quest to conceive the universe as homogeneous. The
Scholastics had taken over from Aristotle the quest for an unequivocal description of
nature. The Terminists of the fourteenth century, who had denied reality to universals,
were obsessed with precision in language and objected to any equivocation whatsoever,
and in their  quest  to  eliminate  equivocation and clarify  terms made a  number of
important conceptual advances in kinematics and astronomy, although they made no
significant contributions  to mathematics. At the same time,  however,  they followed
Aristotle and earlier Scholastic philosophers in holding that the universe has different
domains governed by different kinds of ‘causes’ or principles. They repudiated the idea
of dialectic as an overarching science and defended a diversity of approaches to nature.
By  contrast,  the  Renaissance  philosophers of  nature  such  as  Telesio  and  Bruno,
returning  to  the  philosophy  of  the  Stoics,  rejected  this  pluralism,  asserting  the
fundamental homogeneity of the universe. They replaced Aristotelian forms with forces
as the basic principle of action and argued that everything in the universe must be
explained in terms of basic forces. But at  the same time Bruno,  following Nicholas
Cusanus, argued that there is an inevitable imprecision in our language. The universe,
he argued, can never be totally characterized through language; our terms are mere
approximations, and diverse symbolic forms are required to reveal diverse facets of this
homogeneous  universe.122 Although  sympathetic  to  some  extent  to  the  use  of
mathematics, Bruno criticized excessive preoccupation with mathematical reasoning.
The natural philosophers we associate with the scientific revolution continued to
believe that the universe was homogeneous, but at the same time revived the Scholastic
quest for a totally unambiguous language. As Amos Funkenstein succinctly put it:
The [Scholastics]  considered  their  foremost  task  to  be the purification of  all
ambiguities  from language—all  the more so since  the Nominalist  revolution.
Renaissance philosophies of nature, on the other hand, abandoned the obsession
with language but advanced the ideal  of the homogeneity  of nature in all  its
parts, a nature constructed of one matter and of one set of forces. Only in the
seventeenth century were both ideals fused into one ideal: a science that has an
unequivocal  language  with  which  it  speaks  and  uniform  objects  of  which it
speaks.123
And, unlike both the Terminists and the Stoic revivalists, these philosophers embraced
122 On Bruno’s defence of other forms of language see On the Composition of Images, Signs and Ideas, tr. C. Doris,
New York, Willis, Locker and Owens, 1991.
123 Amost  Funkenstein,  Theology  and the  Scientific Imagination  From the  Middle  Ages  to the  Seventeenth  Century,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 41.
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and advanced the use of mathematics. In the context of this unified ideal, the role of
mathematics in comprehending the world was made central, and the entire cosmos
conceived as a homogeneous order describable in unequivocal language such that it
could be investigated and understood completely through mathematics. 
DESCARTES’ SYSTEM AND CARTESIAN THOUGHT
The first person to develop a coherent total system of philosophy embracing this
unified  ideal  of  linguistic  precision and  ontological  homogeneity  while  upholding
mathematics as a means to achieve it was Descartes.124 Descartes believed that Galileo
had found the right method to examine physical matters by mathematics, but that he
did not  have a philosophy to solve  traditional  problems or provide a metaphysical
framework to set in place a new picture of the world, to guarantee its validity and to
spell out its implications. To achieve this Descartes drew heavily on the work of St
Augustine.125 Randall succinctly summarized the central ideas of the Augustinians:
For  this  great  tradition,  the  proper  object  of  science  is  a  Logos,  a  rational
structure or system of ideas, an intelligible realm the content of which is best
illustrated by the truths of mathematics. The right method of science is the direct
apprehension  or  intuition  of  these  intelligible  ideas  and  their  relations  or
structure by  Nous  or Intellect.  Experience is  fragmentary  and unimportant;  at
best it affords a dim image or illustration of the ideas which intellect perceives in
their purity.126
Descartes developed this position to support his natural philosophy by reconceiving the
physical world so that it could be understood through the intellect, writing that ‘We
shall attribute to matter a nature in which there is nothing at all that anyone can not
know as perfectly as possible’127—i.e. mathematically. The physical world was no longer
an imperfect imitation of the ideal world of forms; it was comprehensible with the same
certainty as this ideal world. Accordingly, matter was characterized as extended with all
points in nature fully occupied. Particles of extension were taken to exist as corpuscles,
differing  in  size,  figure  and  velocity  with  the  added  geometrical  property  of
impenetrability. Matter and motion were taken to be conserved. Descartes resolved to
account for all the Aristotelian qualities in terms of matter and motion alone, following
the Atomists in eliminating teleology as a valid form of explanation in the physical
world.
 While  rejecting  Aristotelian  physics,  Descartes  followed  Aristotle  and  the
Aristotelians in presenting his whole system as founded on first principles from which
124 For a thorough study of Descartes’ relation to his predecessors, see Stephen Gaukroger,  Descartes: An
Intellectual Biography, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. See esp. p. 209.
125 The extent to which he did so is not entirely clear. Gaukroger (p. 207) ascribes less influence to St
Augustine than did Randall.
126 Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 365.
127 From Traité du monde, cited by Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 375.
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everything else could be derived. However, for Descartes, there is only one science of
nature; there is no qualitative diversity in nature and no need for different sciences
based  on  different  principles  to  deal  with  different  domains  of  nature.  The  first
principles are based on self-evident axioms. As Descartes put it:
Intuitive knowledge is an illumination of the soul, whereby it beholds in the light
of God those things which it pleases him to reveal to us by a direct impression of
divine clearness  on our understanding, which in this  is  not considered  as  an
agent, but only as receiving the rays of divinity.128
To some extent Descartes disguised his starting point in his Meditations on First Philosophy
by  doubting  everything possible  and then  offering  revised Thomist proofs for  the
existence of God to ground knowledge of the physical world, but as Randall pointed
out,  ‘Descartes  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  are  really  proofs  of  the  fixed
mathematical order of nature, which cannot be proved, as any proof has to assume
it.’129 At the same time Descartes accorded with the tradition of Christian thought in
granting an even more fundamental place to the intellect and will than to the physical
world. God and mind were capable of autonomous action transcending the principles
which operated in the physical world. This enabled him to explain the present state of
the world as a result of the will of God, and allowed for the existence of conscious
beings  not  part of the mechanical  order  of  matter  in motion to comprehend such
matter in motion and be the seat of secondary qualities.
Descartes’ attempted to offer explanations for a vast diversity of phenomena, with
surprisingly  little  success.  Almost  all  his  mechanical  explanations  turned out  to  be
wrong. Corpuscles of matter as he had conceived them, even with the non-geometrical
property of  impenetrability  and a  conserved  quantity  of  motion,  did  not  to  have
enough properties to explain anything much. And the explanations offered, despite
being caste in a form capable of mathematical treatment, were characterized by an
almost complete absence of mathematical treatment. This did not worry Descartes who
believed that  the  enormous complication of  movements  and interactions precluded
mathematical treatment. As Randall characterized his view, ‘Only God the perfect
geometer could know the details of the pure space or extension out of which he created
the world.’130 
Subsequent generations of natural philosophers and scientists took up the problems
raised by Descartes and succeeded in developing more powerful mathematics and, with
some modifications, were able to advance Descartes’ approach or some modification of
it not only in physics, but also in chemistry, biology, economics and to some extent
even psychology. Usually,  this was at the expense of Descartes’ extreme position on
what could  be  admitted  as  a  physical  explanation.  Most  importantly,  Newtonians
admitted action at a distance (dismissed by Cartesians as occult qualities). But in other
ways, the Newtonians augmented the Egyptianism of Descartes’ system of thought. To
128 Lettres au Marquis de Newcastle, March or April, 1648, in Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 388.
129 Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 389.
130 ibid., p. 377.
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begin with, treating time as a dimension of space paved the way for the elimination of
temporal development from physics, and further developments obviated the need to
postulate  God and  mind  to  underpin  the  reality  of  the  physical.  What Descartes
bequeathed to his successors was an ideal of knowledge of the natural world which was
almost  entirely  Egyptian, synthesizing the Egyptianism of  all  previous  traditions of
thought and then developing this to new levels, and it was this ideal that influenced
subsequent science even more than his philosophy of nature. With some modifications,
often associated with advances in mathematics, this ideal was upheld and reached its
apogee in the work of Einstein. While the rise of modern science was associated with
the denigration of Aristotelian predicate logic because of its association with the notion
of  substantial  forms,  the  development  of  symbolic  logic  made  it  possible  for
epistemologists  to  attempt  to  account  for  both  mathematics  and  post-Aristotelian
science through  this  logic.  The  ideal  of  science  of  Einstein  and  his  followers,  to
effectively  eliminate  time  altogether  and  to  construe  the  totality  of  existence  in
mathematical terms, an ideal supported by most logical empiricists deploying advances
in  symbolic  logic,131 came close to  replicating  the uncompromising  Egyptianism of
Parmenides and Zeno.
THE FUTURE OF EGYPTIANISM
We have already noted the quest to deny any reality to creative becoming and to
uphold the ideal of certain knowledge of an in principle perfectly knowable world has
generated  a  number  of  insoluble  problems.  Addressing  these  problems  or
accommodating them has been one of the central concerns of mainstream philosophy
and science. However, as we have already noted, there is a more fundamental problem
associated with the efforts to extend this conception of knowledge and the world to
ourselves,  a  problem  which  has  been  central  to  philosophical thought ever  since
Descartes.  Descartes  left  the  relationship  between  mind  and  body  unintelligible,
generating a whole range of other problems, including the problem of the relationship
between  free-will  and determinism and between  the  knower and  the  known. The
advance of scientism, the notion that the advance of science will eventually explain
everything including consciousness as an effect of the structure and interaction between
mathematically  describable  physical  components is  ultimately  incoherent.  If  we  as
knowers are reduced to mere effects of the interactions between our components (or
intense curvatures in space-time) then knowledge itself  must be an illusion,  and the
claim to such knowledge is then self-contradictory. The incoherence of this position led
to a whole range of ‘idealist’ philosophies taking either the individual ‘mind’ (Berkeley,
Kant and Husserl) or the social ‘mind’ (Fichte and Hegel) as the ultimate reference
131 Including Willard van Orman Quine in Word & Object, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1960, p. 172 & 253ff.,
but most vigorously by Adolf Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, 2nd ed. Dordrecht, Holland,
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973.
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point for developing a systematic philosophy and used this to reduce the significance of
the claims to knowledge of the physical sciences. This has led to quite different forms of
Egyptianism which I do not intend to consider here. But such philosophies are then
faced with the problem of having to presuppose mind and thereby are in no position to
explain its having come into being (although it could be argued that this is precisely
what Hegel tried to do, developing a new kind of logic to do it). 
This problem of accounting for the emergence of mind brings to light the most
basic problem of the whole tradition of Egyptianist thought—the basic assumptions
about what is knowledge and what can count as an explanation presuppose that there is
no real becoming. Somehow, all appearance of becoming if it is to be explained in the
canonical way must be shown not to be real becoming but merely the appearance of
this.  This  is  not  only  the  core  problem  in  accounting  for  the  emergence  of
consciousness, the most difficult problem of all, but in accounting for the emergence of
any kind of diversity in the universe. This problem was recognized and succinctly stated
by Charles Sanders Peirce:
Is there such a thing in nature as increase in variety? Were things simpler, was
variety less in the original  nebula from which the solar system is supposed to
have grown than it is now when the land and the sea swarms with animals and
plant forms with their intricate anatomies and still more wonderful economies?
It would seem as  if  there were an increase in variety, would it  not? And yet
mechanical  law, which the scientific  infallibilist  tells  us  is  the only  agency of
nature,  mechanical  law  can  never  produce  diversification.  That  is  a
mathematical truth—a proposition of analytic mechanics; and anybody can see
without any algebraical apparatus that mechanical law out of like antecedents
can only produce like consequents. It is the very idea of law.132
Is  Peirce’s  complaint  relevant  to  contemporary  science?  Science  has  been
dramatically transformed over the last century. The focus of physics has changed from
the quest to discover  the laws of nature to finding the underlying invariants within
nature,  interpreted mathematically  as ‘symmetries’. Such symmetries were always  a
concern of  modern physics,  but  they  were focused upon and their nature and the
relationships between them systematically investigated only recently. Symmetries were
thought by  Heisenberg,  one  of  the first  scientists  to  promote  them as  being ‘truly
fundamental in nature’, as ‘the archetypes of all matter and the ground of material
existence … the scientific descendents of Plato’s ideal forms.’133 The ultimate end is now
seen as the search for supersymmetry. However, despite appearances, the goal is still
essentially the same; the search for supersymmetry is still characterized as ‘unveiling the
ultimate laws of nature’.134 
132 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Synechism, Fallibilism, and Evolution’ [1897] in Philosophical Writings of Peirce,
ed. Justus Buchler, New York, Dover Publications, 1955, p. 357.
133 F. David Peat, Synchronicity, Toronto, Bantam Books, 1987, p. 94.
134 See for instance Kane,  Supersymmetry: Squarks, Photinos, and the Unveiling of the Ultimate Laws of Nature. The
relationship between conservation laws and symmetry was analysed and clarified by Eugene P. Wigner in
‘Symmetry and Other Physical Problems’, Symmetries and Reflections, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1970.
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While mainstream science is still  dominated by the quest to grasp the whole of
reality through mathematics, it is now acknowledge that this is not equivalent to being
able to predict the future. It has been appreciated that to explain the diversity in the
world the simple deterministic models of the past will  have to be abandoned. This
became evident with quantum physics, and a central role was accordingly granted to
quantum fluctuations in the origins of the universe. Physicists have also given a place to
‘symmetry  breaking’  to  account for the obvious lack of  symmetry  in  the observed
diversity within the world, notably the diversity of forces and elementary particles. But
the  notion  of  ‘symmetry  breaking’  is  based  on  representing  such  diversity  as  a
manifestation of deeper symmetries.135 At the intermediate level, one of the most active
areas  of  science  is  the  quest  to  understand  organized  complexity,  including self-
organization  and emergence.  This,  it  is  believed,  will  allow us  to  understand the
emergence of life.136 Does this  involve a break with the past?  Nonlinear dynamical
systems, the preferred way of representing such complexity mathematically, are capable
of representing the world as unpredictable and generative of macroscopic patterns; but
this is at the level of appearance. The dynamics are deterministic and rule out anything
but the appearance of creative emergence. As Per Bak, one of the leading members of
the Santa Fe Institute,  pointed out  with reference to the application of  complexity
theory to examine ‘complex adaptive systems’: ‘[W]hat is adaptability of a complex
system? Since “purpose” and “rationality,” and thus “learning” and “adaptability” do
not really exist in deterministic dynamical systems, the question should really be: which
are  the  features  of  complex systems  that  an  outside  observer  might  interpret  as
adaptability?’137 Could a combination of quantum fluctuations, symmetry-breaking and
complexity  account for  the  variety  of  the  world? Even  at  the  level  of  physics  the
challenge of even beginning to carry out this program is overwhelming. Consider the
complaint of a popular expositor of elementary particle physics,  Christine Sutton, to
just a few of the limitations of this science:
Why … is electric charge quantized, with the proton’s charge the same size (but
opposite sign) as the electron’s? This comes down to asking why the quarks have
charges  of 2/3 and 1/3, and leptons have charges 0 and 1 in units of e, the
charge  of  an  electron.  Electroweak  theory  does  not  say  what  these  charges
should be; they have in effect to be inserted ‘by hand’. Moreover the masses of
all  the  quarks  and  leptons  are  quite  arbitrary,  as  are  the  strengths  of  the
interactions...138
135 See P.C.W. Davies and J. Brown, ‘Introduction’ in Superstrings: A Theory of Everything? Cambridge, C.U.P.,
1988, pp. 1-69, p. 55.
136 For a succinct statement of this project and ideas associated with it, see Gregoire Nicolas, ‘Physics of far-
from-equilibrium systems and self-organisation’ in  The New Physics  ed. Paul Davies, Cambridge, C.U.P.,
1989, pp. 316-347.
137 Per Bak, ‘Self-Organized Criticality: A Holistic View of Nature’, Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality,
ed. George A. Cowan, David Pines and David Meltzer, Proceedings Volume XIX, Santa Fe Institute
Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1994, pp.477-96, p. 492.
138 Christine Sutton, The Particle Connection, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 163.
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That there are people who believe that the vast diversity of forms, processes, constants
and ratios in the universe, including the emergence of sentience and the higher levels of
consciousness, can be attributed to nothing but quantum fluctuations, a succession of
symmetry-breakings and patterns produced by interacting components at the edge of
chaos suggests hubris rather than intelligent commitment to a research program.139
CONCLUSION
So what is the problem? The privileged place given to mathematics within science
is an issue, but this raised the question Why does mathematics have this privileged
status?  Meyerson  argued,  first  through an  historical  study  of  the  development  of
science, and then through philosophical arguments, that Egyptianism is built into the
ideals of explanation that are presupposed within science. It follows from seeking to
deduce  the  phenomena  from  its  antecedents  of  which  it  must  be  the  logical
consequence, along with the postulate of the rationality of nature.140 It is this model of
explanation that justifies granting so much importance to mathematical models. So is
the  problem  deeply  held  assumptions  about  what  is  to  count  as  a  satisfactory
explanation,  as  Meyerson  suggested?  This  study,  while  to  a  considerable  extent
confirming Meyerson’s claim, has been concerned to show where this ideal came from
and how it evolved to reveal even deeper assumptions underlying it. What we have seen
is that the most basic assumption is that knowledge is a kind of perception of what is
omni-temporal. 
The avoidance of the conclusions reached by Parmenides and Zeno from Plato
onwards (with the exception of the Atomists), that there is simply one, unchanging,
immutable  being,  involved  allowing  diverse  other,  usually  quite  crude  forms  of
knowledge and explanation associated with the agency of deities, to complement the
ideal  form  of  knowledge.  With  Christianity  an  extra  explanatory  principle  was
introduced by  allowing an all-powerful  willing  God to  create  and differentiate  the
cosmos in  the  first  place.  The extreme form  of  Egyptianism  was  also  avoided  in
different schools of philosophy by embracing and developing specific aspects of it while
expressly repudiating others – such as the assumption of a homogenous universe or the
ideal  of  describing the whole of  reality  with a  univocal  language.  All  the  different
developments  of Egyptianism were brought together in the seventeenth century by
Descartes, and even then Descartes had recourse to God and a mind conceived to be of
a different order from the physical world. Without this God and disallowing Cartesian
dualism, we were forced back to Parmenides’ position or something very close to it, and
evolution as creative emergence, and our own existence as conscious beings, became
139 For an exploration of the issues associated with this quest see Roger Penrose, Abner Shimony, Nancy
Cartwright  and  Stephen  Hawking,  The  Large,  the  Small  and  the  Human  Mind,  ed.  Malcolm  Longair,
Cambridge, C.U.P, 1997.
140 This was argued historically by Émile Meyerson in Identity and Reality, [1912] tr. Kate Loewenberg, New
York, Macmillan, 1930, and philosophically in Explanation in the Sciences.
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unintelligible. 
But the initial assumption about what is knowable, and various other developments
that  followed  the  acceptance  of  this  basic  assumption,  can  be,  and  have  been
questioned.  Most  profoundly,  alternatives  have been developed in  history  and the
‘humanistic’ human sciences (beginning with Vico, Herder and Hegel and developing
through the tradition of hermeneutics—to which Husserl contributed despite himself).
These alternatives have been further developed in philosophical anthropology, and in
post-mechanistic philosophical and theoretical  biology.  In the realm of  the physical
sciences, Egyptianism was more deep-rooted, partly because of the successes deriving
from  this  Egyptianism;  but  some  philosophers  have  questioned  the  fundamental
assumptions  of  Egyptianism  in  relation  to  the  whole  of  nature.  Reviving  non-
Egyptianist tendencies in Aristotle, Nicholas Cusanus and Bruno, natural philosophers
such as  Leibniz, Boscovich, Herder (developing Kant’s pre-critical philosophy), Goethe
and Schelling and then Bergson, Peirce, Whitehead and more recently Deleuze (and
those  influenced by  such  philosophers)  have  gradually  worked  towards new  post-
Egyptian ways of understanding the cosmos as essentially creative becoming, upholding
a conception of the cosmos closer to that of Anaximander and Heraclitus than to later
Greek philosophers. Even  among these philosophers, though, it  was  only  after  the
immense and unsuccessful struggle by Schelling to reconcile the notion of freedom with
determinism, required to uphold Schelling’s Parmenidian conviction that it is possible
to have an intellectual intuition of the Absolute as the unconditioned totality and unity
of the cosmos, that the radical step of jettisoning determinism was taken. This required
a radical rethinking of the role of mathematics in comprehending the cosmos, of the
role of non-mathematical  concepts  and forms of explanation, the limits  of  univocal
concepts, the role of analogy, metaphor, metonym and narrative in language, thinking
and comprehending,  and of the complex relationship and interdependence between
abstract thought, imagination and ‘pre-predicative’ experience such as ‘feelings’ and
other forms of ‘tacit knowledge’. Scientists who have attempted to follow these post-
Schellingian philosophers, such as Prigogine, have sometimes not fully appreciated how
radical were these philosophers, and how radical is the revision in science required to
do justice to their insights.141 
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141 This has been argued by Kampis in  Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science, p. 461ff. For a
further  discussion of this  issue,  see  Physics  and the  Ultimate  Significance  of Time: Bohm,  Prigogine and  Process
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